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COMMENT
PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN A BROKERAGE
FIRM'S CUSTOMER ACCOUNT AGREEMENT
[Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332
(1987)].
I must say that, as a litigant, I should dread a lawsuit beyond al-
most anything else short of sickness and death.,
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the public has become more involved in the securi-
ties markets. 2 This involvement has led to more disputes between
the public and members of the securities industry.3 Thus, investors
have become more cautious in where they put their money, and to
whom they give their money. 4 Securities arbitration disputes typi-
cally involve allegations of excessive trading, churning, unauthorized
trades, unsuitable investments, or failure to execute trades.5
Investors are increasingly choosing arbitration over litigation as
1. Burger, Using Arbitration to Achieve Justice - Remarks by Warren E. Burger, Chief
Justice of the United States before the American Arbitration Association and the Minnesota State
Bar Association, 40 ARB. J. Dec. 1985, at 3, 4 (quoting Learned Hand).
2. Katsoris, The Securities Arbitrators'Nightmare, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3, 3 (1986).
3. Id.
4. V. HARPER, HANDBOOK OF INVESTMENT PROCEDURES AND SERVICES xxi (2d ed.
1986).
5. McMurray, Arbitration Can be Better Than Litigation When Investors and Brokers
Don't Agree, Wall St.J., Apr. 30, 1986, at 35, col. 4. These illegal techniques give rise
to causes of action under the federal securities laws. See infra notes 28-50 and accom-
panying text.
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the forum for their dispute resolution.6 Achieving justice between
the parties is the purpose of arbitration.7 Its function is to achieve a
final resolution of the dispute in an easier, more expeditious and less
expensive manner than litigation.8 Consequently, it is a preferential
method of settling disputes.9
For many years, brokerage houses have included arbitration
clauses in their customer account agreements. In 1953, however, the
United States Supreme Court expressly refused to enforce such
agreements in Wilko v. Swan.10 The Wilko Court's reasoning was
based upon certain sections of the Securities Act of 1933.1" Yet, the
Wilko Court's ruling seemed to belie the intent and application of the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).12 Thirty-five years later, in Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,13 the United States Supreme
6.

















1987 1/2 year 951 1986
39% increase over
1987 projected 2200 1986
Letter from Robert Coulson, President: American Arbitration Association (AAA), to
Andrea M. Benson, Esq., Associate General Counsel and Managing Director, Piper,
Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc. (Aug. 28, 1987) (AAA arbitrator acceptance letter).
The above quoted figures only represent those disputes brought under AAA
supervision.
7. Sterk, Enforceablility of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy
Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481, 483 (1981).
8. R. RODMAN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 3 (1984).
9. Id. See generally Baldwin v. Moses, 319 Mass. 401, 66 N.E.2d 24 (1946); Caro-
lina Virginia Fashion Exhibitors, Inc. v. Gunter, 41 N.C. App. 407, 255 S.E.2d 414
(1979).
10. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
11. See infra notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 15-26 and accompanying text.
13. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987). The McMahon decision held that claims brought
under both the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) were arbitrable. Id. at 2343-46.
This Comment will focus solely upon the Court's interpretation of the federal
[Vol. 14
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Court affirmatively embraced the arbitration of securities disputes
brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.14
This Comment advocates the overruling of the Wilko doctrine.
The Comment's organizational structure is divided into four parts.
First, a general introduction to the relevant statutory framework that
applies to securities arbitration disputes is discussed. Second, an
overview of the benchmark Supreme Court cases that have ad-
dressed securities arbitration disputes is given. Third, a detailed ex-
amination of the effects of the McMahon decision is provided.
Fourth, an examination of the effects of McMahon leads to the con-
clusion that the Wilko doctrine should be overruled.
I. THE RELEVANT STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A. The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925
American courts have frequently either refused recognition of ar-
bitration agreements or openly denied enforcement of agreements
that expressly chose arbitration as the forum for dispute resolu-
tion.15 In response to this nonrecognition, Congress enacted the
Federal Arbitration Act.' 6 The purpose of the FAA was to deliber-
ately alter the judicial atmosphere previously existing in regard to
arbitration agreements.17 The congressional committee that
adopted the FAA stated:
Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, and the ef-
fect of the bill is simply to make the contracting party live up to his
agreement. He can no longer refuse to perform his contract when
it becomes disadvantageous to him. An arbitration agreement is
placed upon the same footing as other contracts, where it
belongs. 18
By enacting the FAA Congress resolved two issues. The first issue
concerned a lack of an expressed congressional intent advocating ar-
bitration in this country. Second, a major policy consideration of the
Act was attempting to relieve congestion in the courts by providing
parties "with an alternative method for dispute resolution that would
securities laws. The resolution of the RICO issue will not be addressed. The statu-
tory citation for RICO is 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982).
14. Id. at 2341-43.
15. See Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A, v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978,
984 (2d Cir. 1942); Fletcher, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Ar-
bitration Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REV. 393, 393-94 (1987); Note, The Preclusive Effect of
Arbitral Determinations in Subsequent Federal Securities Litigation, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 655,
658-59 (1987); Note, Arbitrability of Disputes Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 71 IOWA L.
REV. 1137, 1139 (1986).
16. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-9 (1986).
17. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1924).
18. Id. at 1-2.
1988]
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be speedier and less costly than litigation."t9
Recent court decisions have amplified the full intent and focus of
the FAA.20 In fact, courts have judicially recognized that there exists
a "national policy favoring arbitration."21 This policy has led courts
to recognize the strong congressional intent favoring arbitration
agreements. 22 Subsequently, the Supreme Court has declared that it
will rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.23 Thus, the intent
and scope of enforceability of the FAA is now generally immune
from adverse judicial scrutiny.
Upon enacting the FAA, Congress mandated the enforcement of
arbitration agreements. 24 The pertinent sections of the FAA that
bear upon predispute arbitration agreements are sections two and
three. Section two provides that any contract involving commerce
that has an agreement to arbitrate shall "be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract." 2 5 Section three mandates a stay of
proceeding upon the trial court where any issue before the trial court
is referable to arbitration.26 Therefore, Congress, by enacting the
FAA, placed the judiciary on notice that arbitration agreements de-
19. Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1179-80 (lth Cir.
1981); see Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974); see generally
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
20. See, e.g., Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 6-7.
21. Id. at 10.
22. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985).
23. Id.
24. See generally Sterk, supra note 7, at 482-92.
25. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)(emphasis added). This section provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy there-
after arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform
the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbi-
tration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or
refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id.
26. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982) provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for
such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satis-
fied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitra-
tion under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay
the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with
the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in
default in proceeding with such arbitration.
[Vol. 14
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serve equal treatment as would any other agreement under the law of
contracts.
B. The Securities Act of 1933
The American stock market crashed in 1929. Because of the cata-
clysmic effect upon the nation, the President urged Congress to en-
act legislation that would promise better investor protection. In
1933, Congress recognized the hazards of unequal bargaining posi-
tions between those inside the securities industry and the outside in-
vestor.27 The congressional response was to enact the Securities Act
of 1933.28 The Securities Act requires the registration of securities
publicly offered by a company or persons controlling a company.
The Act requires the use of a prospectus that provides for full disclo-
sure of complete, material information in connection with public of-
ferings.29 It also regulates fraud in connection with the sale of such
securities .30
Predispute arbitration agreements apply to three sections of the
Securities Act. First, section 12(2) imposes liability upon a seller of
securities who provides information that is "untrue" or not fully dis-
closed to a securities buyer.31 Second, section 14 provides that no
party may waive any binding condition, stipulation, or provision that
is codified within the Securities Act or the rules and regulations of
the Commission. 32 Third, section 22(a) bestows the federal district
27. Comment, Predispute Arbitration Agreements Between Brokers and Investors: The Ex-
tension ofWilko to Section 10(b) Claims, 46 MD. L. REV. 339, 341 (1987) (quoting S. REP.
No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933)).
28. 15 U.S.C. § § 77a-77aa (1982).
29. See id. § § 77j, 77k (1982).
30. Id. § § 77a-77aa.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2) (1982) provides:
Any person who -....
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provi-
sions of section 77c of this title, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a)
of said section), by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a pro-
spectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a ma-
terial fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission),
and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in
the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or
omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him,
who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdic-
tion, to recover the consideration paid for such security with interest
thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender
of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
Id.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982) states:
1988]
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courts with jurisdiction over offenses and violations under the Act.33
C. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Congressional anxiety concerning the securities industry was not
relieved by the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933. In 1934,
Congress enacted further legislation that addressed additional re-
quirements for the disclosure of information.34 The Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 Exchange Act requires the registration of
securities prior to listing and trading on an exchange, as well as the
registration of over-the-counter securities in which there is signifi-
cant trading interest.35
The Exchange Act requires the registration of broker-dealers, na-
tional securities exchanges, and associations of securities dealers
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Exchange Act
also regulates fraud and manipulation of the purchase or sale of se-
curities, and generally regulates the trading markets in securities.3 6
The Exchange Act was passed to insure the protection of investors
"against the manipulation of stock prices through regulation of
transactions consummated upon securities exchanges and in over-
the-counter markets, and to impose regular reporting requirements
on those companies which have stock listed on national securities
exchanges."37
Predispute arbitration agreements apply to two sections of the Ex-
change Act. First, section 10(b) makes it unlawful for any seller of
securities to "employ . . . any manipulative or deceptive device [in]
... connection with the purchase or sale of any security."3 8 Second,
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring
any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of
the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void.
Id. (emphasis added).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1986) provides:
The district courts of the United States, and the United States courts of
any Territory, shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations under this
subchapter and under the rules and regulations promulgated by the Com-
mission in respect thereto, and, concurrent with State and Territorial courts,
of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or
duty created by this subchapter....
Id.
For a discussion addressing the relationship between these statutory sections,
see infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
34. 15 U.S.C. § § 78a-78kk (1982).
35. See H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAw 616 (1977).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange ...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
[Vol. 14
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section 29(a) provides that no party may waive any binding condi-
tion, stipulation or provision that is codified within the Exchange
Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any required rule of ex-
change. 39 Section 29(a) is equivalent to section 4 of the Securities
Act.40
Despite the limiting language expressed in several sections of each
Act, courts have generally construed the Securities Act and the Ex-
change Act in pari materia as a single comprehensive regulatory
scheme. 4' However, these acts do not overlap completely, and cer-
tain rights may be available under one Act but not under the other.
42
D. The Securities and Exchange Commission
To facilitate the implementation of the rules and regulations codi-
fied by both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, Congress cre-
ated the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).43 The SEC is
an independent regulatory agency that enforces the federal securities
laws by conducting investigations which may lead to criminal prose-
cutions, civil actions for injunctive relief, or to administrative pro-
ceedings that impose remedial sanctions on broker-dealers and
investment advisors.44
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for protection of investors.
Id.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982) provides:
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive
compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation
thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void.
Id.
40. Cf. supra notes 31, 38 (each section creates explicit civil liability concerning
the fraudulent sales of securities under each respective Act).
41. See Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 876 (1982). The Gunter court cites
several federal cases which held that when a court is faced with claims under both
Acts, the policy reasons for securities regulation are the basis of reasoning in judicial
construction of the Acts. See, e.g., Tullis v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 551 F.2d 632, 634-38
(5th Cir. 1977); Ballard & Cordell Corp. v. Zoller & Danneberg Exploration, Ltd.,
544 F.2d 1059, 1066 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977).
42. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 877, provides:
For example, section 5(a) of the 1933 Act renders unlawful the selling
of unregistered securities, absent an exemption. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a). Sec-
tion 12(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(1), gives one who purchases a
security sold in violation of section 5(a) a right to rescind the transaction or
to recover damages if he has sold the security. The 1934 Act has no compa-
rable provision. On the other hand, section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p, directed at trading on the basis of inside information, is a unique
express liability provision with no counterpart in the 1933 Act.
Id. at 877 n.24.
43. 15 U.S.C. 78(d) (1982).
44. See H. BLUMENTHAL, supra note 35.
1988]
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Additionally, the SEC's staff processes the numerous filings re-
quired under the federal securities laws, including securities registra-
tion under the Securities Act. The SEC has extensive rule-making
authority granted by specific provisions, such as section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, as well as general rule-making authority.45
Congress has given the SEC extensive oversight authority over
self-regulatory organizations and broker-dealers.46 The SEC has
specifically "followed" complaints made against broker-dealers and
their employees.47 Remaining responsibilities include overseeing
and regulation of the activities of stock exchanges and securities as-
sociations, including the rules that the exchanges and associations
prescribe upon their members.48
Utilizing its quasi-legislative powers, the SEC has set forth Rule
l0b-5. 49 This rule, as a complement to the Exchanges Act's section
10(b), declares that it shall be unlawful for any person to "employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud .. .a person "in connec-
tion with the purchases or sale of any security." 50 The disclosure
and antiwaiver provisions of the Securities Act, Exchange Act and
Rule lOb-5 were designed to protect the small investor. These en-
actments prohibit those on the "inside" from taking advantage of
their superior knowledge to profit at the expense of stockholders or
the investing public.51
45. Id.
46. See H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK, § 1.02 (1987-88 ed.) (com-
prehensive description of a Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO)); id. at § 22.01 (com-
prehensive description of a broker-dealer).
47. M. Fitterman, SEC Oversight. Investor Complaints Against Broker-Dealers and SRO
Administered Arbitration Systems, reprinted in RESOLVING SECURITIES DISPUTES, No. 535
(D. Robbins 1986).
48. H. BLUMENTHAL, supra note 35; see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § § 77h, 77s, 77t (1982);
id.,§ § 78a, 78i, 78s.
The major exchanges of the United States are: (1) American Stock Exchange,
(2) Boston Stock Exchange, (3) Chicago Board Options Exchange, (4) Cincinnati
Stock Exchange, (5) Midwest Stock Exchange, (6) New York Stock Exchange, (7) Pa-
cific Stock Exchange, and (8) Philadelphia Stock Exchange. See Special Bibliography on
Dispute Resolution and the Securities Industry, 42 ARB. J. June 1987 at 14.
49. Rule lob-5 is codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
50. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986) provides in its entirety:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
51. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 482 (D.N.Y. 1968).
[Vol. 14
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II. RELEVANT CASE LAW - INTERPRETATIONAL ISSUES ARISE
A. Wilko v. Swan: The Wilko Doctrine Emerges
In the case of Wilko v. Swan,52 a customer charged his broker with a
violation of section 12(2) of the Securities Act.5s Without answering
the complaint, the broker moved to stay the trial of the action pursu-
ant to section 3 of the FAA,54 in accordance with the terms of their
margin account agreement. 55
The Supreme Court ruled that section 12(2) created "a special
right to recover for misrepresentation which differs substantially
from the common-law action in that the seller is made to assume the
burden of proving lack of scienter." 5 6 The crux of the Court's deci-
sion was not based upon section 12(2), but rather upon section 14 of
the Securities Act. 5 7 The Court reasoned that section 14 maintains
that an arbitration agreement is a "stipulation" and, thus, the right
to select a judicial forum is the kind of "provision" that cannot be
waived.58
Although the Court did recognize the desireability of arbitration
as evinced by the passage of the FAA, it perceived the congressional
52. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
53. Id. at 428. The customer alleged that the broker falsely represented the
value of the purchased stock and purposely omitted information concerning the
stock. Id. at 429; see also supra note 31.
54. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428; see supra note 26.
55. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 429-30. A "margin account" is established when the bro-
ker extends credit to the customer for a portion of the purchase price and holds the
customer's securities as collateral for the loan. This is compared with a "cash ac-
count" where the customer is obligated to make full payment in cash for any securi-
ties that are purchased. D. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION - MATERIALS FOR A
BASIC COURSE (2d ed. 1980).
The customer account agreement in Wilko stated:
Any controversy arising between us under this contract shall be deter-
mined by arbitration pursuant to the Arbitration Law of the State of New
York, and under the rules of either the Arbitration Committee of the Cham-
ber of Commerce of the State of New York, or of the American Arbitration
Association, or of the Arbitration Committee of the New York Stock Ex-
change or such other Exchange as may have jurisdiction over the matter in
dispute, as I [the investor] may elect. Any arbitration hereunder shall be
before at least three arbitrators.
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 432 n.15.
The Wilko exception does not apply to member-to-member disputes or to dis-
putes which involve sophisticated investors and their brokers. Comment, Section
1 0(b) and Rule lOb-5 Federal Securities Law Claims: The Need for the Uniform Disposition of
the Arbitration Issue, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 199, 208-09 (1987) (citing Peloso, Agreements
to Arbitrate, 13 REV. SEC. REG. 943, 947 (1980)).
56. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431. "The term 'scienter,' as applied to conduct necessary
to give rise to an action for civil damages ... refers to a mental state embracing intent
to deceive, manipulate or defraud." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 700 (5th ed. 1983).
57. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430.
58. Id. at 434-35.
19881
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intent of the FAA as simply an alternative to the complications of
litigation.59 The Court interpreted Congress' intent as a favorable
attitude toward arbitration, 60 stating that the Securities Act was
crafted "with an eye to the disadvantages under which buyers
labor." 61
The Court further stated that a buyer would surrender one of the
advantages the Act gives him upon agreeing to arbitrate any dis-
pute. 62 Therefore, the Court ruled that "the intention of Congress
concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by holding inva-
lid such an agreement for arbitration of issues arising under the
Act."63 Thus, the customer's advance agreement to arbitrate dis-
putes subsequently arising out of his contract to purchase the securi-
ties was unenforceable under the language of section 14 of the
Securities Act.
The result of the Wilko decision was to indoctrinate the belief that
the Securities Act created a special right of a private remedy for civil
liability. Thus, an exception to the clear provisions of the FAA was
created.
B. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Company:
A "Colorable Argument" Appears
In the interim between Wilko and Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. ,64 fed-
eral courts began to utilize the Wilko doctrine in disputes involving
the Exchange Act of 1934.65 The federal courts' view was that the
Wilko doctrine was also logically applicable to disputes involving sec-
tion 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5 as well.66 The Scherk
decision addressed that particular usage of the Wilko doctrine.
In Scherk, Alberto-Culver, an American company, commenced an
action for damages and other relief contending that Mr. Scherk
fraudulently represented the status of certain trademark rights.67 Al-
berto-Culver alleged that the misrepresentations violated section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5
59. Id. at 431-32.
60. Id. at 432.
61. Id. at 435.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 438.
64. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
65. See Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831,
835 (7th Cir. 1977); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d
532, 536 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
66. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513-14.
67. Id. at 509.
[Vol. 14
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promulgated by the SEC.68 The Court's ruling in the Scherk case was
predominantly based upon the importance and nature of interna-
tional transactions.69 The majority opinion by Justice Stewart ad-
dressed a colorable argument concerning section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5.
Justice Stewart stated that "[a]t the outset, a colorable argument
could be made that even the semantic reasoning of the Wilko opinion
does not control the case before us." 70 Justice Stewart's assertion,
although obiter dictum, can be presented in four parts: (1) there was
not an express statutory counterpart in section 12(2) in the Ex-
change Act; (2) neither section 10(b) nor Rule lOb-5 speaks of a
private remedy to redress violations of the kind alleged in Scherk;
(3) though courts had recognized a section 10(b) private right of ac-
tion, the Exchange Act, itself, does not establish the special right that
the Court in Wilko found significant; and (4) the jurisdiction provi-
sion of the Securities Act, section 22(a), provided for concurrent
state and federal forums, whereas the parallel section of the Ex-
change Act, section 27, provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction.
Justice Stewart stated that this contrast demonstrated a more re-
strictedjurisdiction.T7 But, because the Court ultimately decided the
finality of the Scherk dispute upon the international elements of the
case and the effects therein, the colorable argument of Mr. Justice
Stewart remained untested.
C. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd: The
"Colorable Argument" Reappears
The interlude between Scherk and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd72 was not untroubled on the federal circuit court level. A split
68. Id.; see supra notes 38, 50 (discussing liability for misrepresentations under
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5).
The dispute arose from the sale of business entities by Mr. Scherk, a German
citizen, to the Alberto-Culver Company. The purchase agreement contained express
warranties whereby Mr. Scherk guaranteed the sole and unencumbered ownership of
the above-mentioned trademarks. Alberto-Culver subsequently learned that the
trademarks were, in fact, subject to substantial encumbrances that threatened to give
others superior rights. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 509.
Alberto-Culver relied on analogical precedent and contended that the Wilko de-
cision caused the Scherk arbitration agreement to be unenforceable. The Court re-
jected Alberto-Culver's contention and held that, although Scherk's conduct
constituted violations of the Exchange Act, the provisions of the FAA could not, in
that case, be ignored. Id.
69. Id. at 513.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 514.
72. 470 U.S. 213 (1985). Upon the enactment of the FAA, all state courts be-
came bound to the FAA under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
1988]
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occured concerning the treatment of complaints that alleged both
federal securities claims and pendent state claims. The holdings of
the various circuit courts began to follow one of two lines of inter-
pretational thought. One viewpoint, supported by the Fifth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits, relied on an approach known as the "inter-
twining doctrine." 73 The other viewpoint, adopted by the Sixth,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, held that to "bifurcate" the pendent
claims from the federal claims was proper concerning arbitrable
claims. 74
In Byrd, a customer filed an action in federal district court alleging
violations of the Exchange Act and of various state law provisions. 75
The parties had a written agreement to arbitrate any dispute that
might arise out of the account. 76 Dean Witter Reynolds did not,
however, attempt to assert that section 10(b) claims are arbitrable
under the FAA. 77 As a result, the Court did not address that issue.
Nevertheless, Justice White's concurring opinion readdressed the ar-
bitration issue. Justice White's dictum addressed two issues that he
felt were left undeveloped in the Byrd decision. 78 He stated that the
nonarbitrability status of claims under the Exchange Act was a mat-
ter of substantial doubt.79 Justice White said that the Wilko decision
was premised upon the interconnection of sections 12(2), 14, and 22
of the Securities Act.80 He declared that "Wilko's reasoning cannot
73. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 216. For a comprehensive discussion of the doctrine of
intertwining, see Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L.
REV. 279, 303 (1984). The doctrine of intertwining has been referred to as an ap-
proach that, when it is impractical if not impossible to separate arbitrable state claims
from nonarbitrable federal securities claims, some courts have held that arbitration
as to the arbitrable claims should be denied and that all issues should be tried to-
gether. See, e.g., Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 824 (1977).
74. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 217. For a comprehensive discussion of the bifurcation of
securities disputes, see Katsoris, supra note 73, at 302. Bifurcation in this context was
done in two ways. One approach was to permit the arbitrable state claim to proceed
to arbitration and concurrently litigate the federal securities claims. The other way
was to stay the arbitration of the state claims until all the federal securities law claims
were resolved. Additionally, it is not clear how res judicata or collateral estoppel
should affect arbitration proceedings.
75. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 214.
76. Id. The agreement provided that "[a]ny controversy between you and the
undersigned arising out of or relating to this contract or the breach thereof, shall be
settled by arbitration." Id. at 215.
Dean Witter Reynolds filed a motion to compel arbitration of the pendent state
claims under the parties' agreement and to stay arbitration pending resolution of the
federal action. Id. at 214.
77. Id. at 219.
78. Id. at 224-25.
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be mechanically transplanted to the (Exchange] Act."81
Justice White's reasoning was that although section 29 of the Ex-
change Act is equivalent to section 14 of the Securities Act, the coun-
terparts of the Securities Act (12(2) and 22) are imperfect, or absent
altogether.8 2 Justice White recognized that causes of action under
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 concerning arbitration were implied
rather than express.83 He said, "I reiterate [those reservations con-
cerning the Exchange Act] to emphasize that the question remains
open and the contrary holdings of the lower courts must be viewed
with some doubt."84 Justice White's concurrence set the stage for
the Supreme Court to rule on the arbitrability of claims brought
under the Exchange Act.
D. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon: The "Colorable
Argument" Comes of Age
Despite the admonitions of Justice Stewart and Justice White in
Scherk and Byrd, the majority of the federal appellate courts contin-
ued to rule that claims brought under the Exchange Act were not
arbitrable.85 However, two federal circuit courts broke rank and be-
gan to rule that such claims were, in fact, arbitrable.86
It was the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
that first addressed the arbitrability or nonarbitrability of claims
brought under the Exchange Act after the Byrd decision. In McMa-
hon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,8 7 the Second Circuit reversed
the district court and endorsed the customer's contention that sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims were not arbitrable.88 The court
refused to overrule this precedent based only upon the defendant's
speculation as to what the Supreme Court may do with what had pre-
viously been settled law. 89
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, how-
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 225.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Sterne v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 808 F.2d 480, 483 (6th Cir.
1987);Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197, 1202
(3d Cir. 1986); King v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 796 F.2d 59, 60 (5th Cir.
1986).
86. See Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291,
296-98 (1st Cir. 1986); Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795
F.2d 1393, 1397-98 (8th Cir. 1986).
87. 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986).
88. Id. at 99.
89. Id. at 97; see Note, Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 1986 DUKE LJ. 548, 564 (1986) (citing Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986)).
19881
13
Howe: Predispute Arbitration Clauses in a Brokerage Firm's Customer Acc
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1988
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
ever, rejected the Second Circuit's lead and was the first federal
court of appeals after the Byrd decision to rule that arbitration agree-
ments are enforceable with regard to claims arising under the Ex-
change Act.90 The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit soon joined the Eighth Circuit's decision.91 Thus, these dis-
cordant holdings induced Shearson/American Express to file a peti-
tion for certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States.92
Justice Stewart's colorable argument could now be put to the test.
In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,93 McMahon, a bro-
kerage firm customer, filed suit against his broker alleging violations
of the antifraud provisions in section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and of the SEC promulgated rule 10b-5. Specifi-
cally, McMahon alleged that the broker engaged in fraudulent,
excessive trading, made false statements and omitted material facts
from the advice given to him.94 Two customer agreements were
signed that provided for arbitration of any controversy relating to
the accounts that were maintained with the broker.95 Pursuant to
their agreement, Shearson/American Express moved to compel arbi-
tration of McMahon's claims in accordance with section 3 of the
FAA.96
The Supreme Court premised its holding by first discussing the
FAA and the FAA's intent.97 The Court stated that "[t]he Act was
intended to 'revers[e] centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements' by 'plac[ing] arbitration agreements upon the same
footing as other contracts.' "98 The Court held that the means to the
mentioned ends are accomplished though section 2 of the FAA,
which provides that arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevoca-
ble, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract." 99 Thus, concluded the
Court, the FAA firmly establishes a federal arbitration policy that re-
90. Phillips, 795 F.2d at 1399.
91. Page, 806 F.2d at 296-98.
92. Brief of Petitioners Requesting Grant of Writ of Certiori, Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987) (No. 86-44).
93. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
94. Id. at 2336.
95. Id. at 2335. The agreement signed by Mr. McMahon stated:
Unless unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy aris-
ing out of or relating to my accounts, to transactions with you for me or this
agreement or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accord-
ance with the rules, then in effect, of the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. or the Boards of Directors of the New York Stock Exchange,
Inc., and/or the American Stock Exchange, Inc. as I may elect.
Id. at 2335-36.
96. Id. at 2336; see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
97. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2337.
98. Id. citing 9 U.S.C. § 2.
99. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2337; see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 14
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quires rigorous enforcement of agreements to arbitrate.100 There-
fore, the FAA, standing alone, mandates enforcement of agreements
to arbitrate statutory claims.1OI
The Court charted its decision in three sections. Each section was
correlated to the three-part argument presented by McMahon. Mc-
Mahon's argument stated that section 29(a) forbids waiver of section
27 of the Exchange Act of 1934.102 The Court rejected this conten-
tion. 103 The Court said that the language of section 29 did not reach
so far. 10 4 The Court stated that section 29(a) forbade the waiver of
compliance with the provisions of the statute, but, "[b]ecause section
27 does not impose any statutory duties, its waiver does not consti-
tute a waiver of 'compliance with any provision' of the Exchange Act
under § 29(a)."105 Thus, the Court ruled that section 29(a) does not
forbid waiver of section 27 of the Exchange Act of 1934.106
McMahon next contended that arbitration agreements effected an
impermissible waiver of the substantive protections of the Exchange
Act.107 The Court analyzed the composition of this argument in two
parts. First, the Court addressed McMahon's contention that predis-
pute agreements are void under section 29(a) because they tend to
result from broker overreaching.1O8 The Court refused to adopt
what it called such an unlikely interpretation of section 29(a).109 Mc-
Mahon's second sub-argument was that arbitration itself weakens the
ability to recover under the Exchange Act." lO The Court noted that
this argument was at the heart of the Court's decision in Wilko,III
and McMahon was urging that the Court should follow its
reasoning. 112
The Court, however, stated that the reasons given in Wilko re-
flected a general suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and the
competence of arbitrabal tribunals." 3 "It is difficult to reconcile
Wilko's mistrust of the arbitrabal process with this Court's subse-
quent decisions involving the Arbitration Act."'114 The Court further
stated that because mistrust of arbitration was the basis for the Wilko
100. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2337.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2338; see supra note 39.




107. Id. at 2339.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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decision, the assessment of arbitration at the present time did not
square with those assessments made in 1953.115 Therefore, the
Court concluded that an arbitration agreement does not effect a
waiver of the substantive protections of the Exchange Act.' 16
The final argument presented by McMahon was that even if sec-
tion 29(a) as enacted did not void predispute arbitration agreements,
Congress had subsequently indicated its desire for such an interpre-
tation of section 29(a).' '7 The thrust of this contention was that in
1975, Congress enacted amendments to the Exchange Act which did
not address the general question of arbitrability of Exchange Act
claims. 118
This argument was based solely on a sentence from a congres-
sional conference report." 9 McMahon contended that the report
amounted to ratification of the Wilko doctrine as broadened to cover
Exchange Act claims.120 The Court found this argument "fraught
with difficulties."12, The Court stated that "[w]e cannot see how
Congress could extend Wilko to the Exchange Act without enacting
into law any provision remotely addressing that subject."122 Thus,
the Court concluded that Congress did not expressly intend for sec-
tion 29(a) to bar the enforcement of all predispute arbitration
agreements. 123
In summary, the Court expressly held that: (1) the waiver of sec-
tion 27 does not constitite a waiver of compliance with any provision
of the Exchange Act under section 29; (2) the assessment of arbitra-
tion, at the present time, does not square with those assessments
made at the time of the Wilko decision; hence, an agreement to arbi-
trate does not effect a waiver of the protections of the Exchange Act;
and (3) Congress did not ratify, explicitly or implicitly, the Wilko doc-
trine in its extensive revisions of the Exchange Act in 1975. Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of
115. Id. at 2341.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2342.
118. Id.
119. Id. The conference report states:
The Senate bill amended section 28 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 with respect to arbitration proceedings between self-regulatory orga-
nizations .... The House amendment contained no comparable provision
.... It was the clear understanding of the conferees that this amendment
did not change extisting law as articulated in Wilko v. Swan, concerning the
effect of arbitration proceedings provisions in agreements entered into by
persons dealing with members and participants of self-regulatory
organizations.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-229, 111 (1975) (cited in McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2343).
120. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2342-43.
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Appeals for the Second Circuit and remanded the case for further
proceedings consistent with their opinion.124 At long last, Justice
Stewart's colorable argument had seasoned.
V. POST-MCMAHON EFFECTS
A. Federal Courts Cast Off McMahon-Type Cases
As a result of the McMahon decision, numerous federal securities
cases were crucially affected. The Supreme Court immediately de-
nied certiorari to all cases that brought forth Exchange Act and
RICO claims which specifically addressed arbitration agreements.
Virtually every federal circuit court contemporaneously dismissed all
cases which directly addressed the McMahon issues. 125 Several
courts ruled that McMahon was intended to be retroactively
applied.
126
B. The Securities and Exchange Commission Reaction
The SEC was affected in two ways by McMahon. First, the SEC
intensified its review of SRO arbitration programs.'27 Second, the
McMahon ruling prompted the SEC to reconsider its Rule 15c2-2,
which conflicted with the McMahon decision.128 Thereafter, because
of the inappropriateness of Rule 15c2-2 in light of the McMahon deci-
sion, the SEC rescinded the rule.129 The recission of Rule 15c2-2
124. Id. at 2346.
125. E.g., Mayaja, Inc. v. Bodkin, 803 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1986); Phillips v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393 (8th Cir. 1986); Smoky Green-
shaw Cotton Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 720 F.2d 1446 (5th
Cir. 1983).
126. E.g., Noble v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 823 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1987);
Nesslage v. York Securities, Inc., 823 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1987); Wolfe v. E.F. Hutton
& Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1032 (11 th Cir. 1986); Badart v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1986); Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986).
127. 19 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1387 (1987).
128. Id. at 1405. Rule 15c2-2 was adopted in November 1983 to address concerns
related to broker-dealers' inclusion of clauses in customer contracts that compelled
customers to arbitrate federal securities law claims, but that did not adequately dis-
close that the clauses did not appear to be binding under interpretations of securities
laws then prevailing. 15 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 2159 (1983). The obvious basis
for this ruling was the Wilko doctrine.
129. Securities and Exchange Commission, Release No. 34-25034 (1987).
Rule 15c2-2 embodied the SEC's determination that the inclusion of arbitration
clauses in customer agreements without disclosure of their nonapplicability to claims
under the federal securities laws was misleading and constituted a fraud. However,
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was quickly applied in the courts.130
C. McMahon's Effect on Claims Under the Securities Act of 1933
The McMahon ruling should receive substantial testing in a short
period of time. The arbitration case load is expected to rise in the
wake of the sudden stock market decline of October 19, 1987.13
Subsequent volatility in the market from the "crash" is expected to
more than double the case load at the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers' (NASD) arbitration program alone.' 3 2 The NASD ex-
pects that more than 4,000 cases will be commenced before the end
of 1987.133 There were 1,587 NASD arbitration cases in 1986.'34
The 1987 case load grew 82 percent over the 1986 level.'35 The
NASD states that the 1988 pace is running at an annualized rate of
45 percent higher.' 3 6 The New York Stock Exchange estimates that
since October the case load has increased sixty percent from levels
one year earlier.' 3 7
The issue concerning the arbitrability of claims brought under the
Exchange Act was affirmatively resolved by the McMahon ruling.1Ss
Several courts have already begun to struggle with McMahon's effect
on this issue. 139
Many courts are currently ruling that McMahon does not apply to
claims brought forth under the Securities Act of 1933. An example
of how these courts are interpreting McMahon is the case of Schultz v.
Robinson-Humphrey/American Express, Inc.14 0 The Schultz court held
that McMahon did not overrule Wilko.'4' The court viewed McMahon
as implicitly reaffirming the nonarbitrability of section 12 claims
under the Securities Act.14
2
130. See, e.g., Villa Garcia v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 833 F.2d 545
(5th Cir. 1987).
131. 19 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1657 (1987); see supra note 4. Undoubtedly,
many investors will be asserting claims of churning and unsuitability concerning their
investments, particularly those investors that lost substantial portfolio value. For a
comprehensive analysis of the October 1987 market decline, see The October Market




135. Wall St.J., Mar. 15, 1988 at 35, col. 3.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See supra notes 85-124.
139. See infra, notes 140, 147 and 151.
140. 19 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1329, 1330 (1988); see also Chang v. Lin, 824
F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the McMahon decision did not overrule the
Wilko doctrine, ruling that it continues to govern).
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Additionally, the Schultz court interpreted McMahon as stongly sug-
gesting that there was a congressional ratification of Wilko in relation
to section 12 claims.143 The court summarily concluded that there
are distinctions between a section 12(2) claim under the Securities
Act and a section 10(b) claim under the Exchange Act. 144 These dis-
tinctions militate against an extension of the McMahon decision to
section 12(2) claims. 14 5 Thus, the Schultz court ruled that actions
brought under the Securities Act of 1933 were not arbitrable.146
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, in Johnson v. O'Brien,147 has also
ruled that the McMahon ruling does not compel the arbitration of
claims brought under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.148
The Johnson court stated:
The respondents assert claims only under section 12(2) of the Se-
curities Act of 1933 and do not allege any section 10(b) violations.
McMahon addressed section 10(b) claims and the enforceability of
predispute arbitration agreements within the context of arbi-
trability of claims under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act. Until Wilko
is overruled, we are compelled to apply the Supreme Court's pre-
vailing precedents with respect to predispute arbitration agree-
ments and federal securities law. 149
Thus, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the parties' predis-
pute arbitration agreement was not enforceable under Wilko..150
A California district court has, however, ruled that claims brought
under the Securities Act of 1933 are arbitrable. In Weisel ex rel.
Staiman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,' 5 l Judge Ronald Lew
ruled that the United States Supreme Court in its McMahon decision
so seriously undermined the rationale of Wilko that Mr. Staiman's
1933 Act claims, like his other claims, must be sent to arbitration. 152
Judge Lew's reasoning was presented in two parts. First, he ob-
served that the antiwaiver provision of both Acts are nearly identi-
cal.153 Thus, the court presumably held that McMahon's ruling on
section 29(a) of the Exchange Act can be transposed to section 14 of
the Securities Act. Second, the court stated that McMahon's state-









151. 673 F. Supp. 1009 (C.D. Cal. 1987); see also Aronson v. Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Fla. 1987).




Howe: Predispute Arbitration Clauses in a Brokerage Firm's Customer Acc
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1988
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
could not be vindicated through arbitration," restricts Wilko
application. 154
Judge Lew noted that Wilko applies only where arbitration would
be inadequate to protect the plaintiff's substantive rights.i55 The
court also stated that since the plaintiff made no showing of inade-
quacy of protection, then the McMahon ruling is required. 156 Judge
Lew, however, did indicate that an immediate appeal of the ruling
would be in order since there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion. 157
VI. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's ruling in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon compels the overruling of the Wilko doctrine. The McMa-
hon court has ruled that section 27 of the Exchange Act does not
impose any statutory duties. Thus, section 27 is procedural law and
not substantive law. Therefore, the waiver of section 27 does not
constitute a waiver of compliance with any provision of the Exchange
Act under section 29(a).
The McMahon interpretation does not conform to the interpreta-
tion of the Wilko court. This assertion holds true even though the
subject matter of the two interpretations are separate, distinct acts
addressing the buying and selling of securities. The special right to
recover that the Wilko court found under the section 12(2) of the
Securities Act cannot contemporaneously, be seen as a substantive
right in light of the McMahon court's interpretation of section 27 of
the Exchange Act. The McMahon court ruled that section 27 imposes
no statutory duties; hence, no substantive right exists. Section 12(2)
of the Securities Act must now be read as procedural in nature and
not substantive. Contrary judicial interpretations cannot stand.
The Wilko court held that the right to select a judicial forum is the
kind of provision that cannot be waived because an arbitration agree-
ment is equated to a stipulation under section 14 of the Securities
Act. The McMahon court ruled that a waiver under section 29(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not effect a waiver of the
protections of the Act. McMahon asserted that these protections
were substantive protections. Thus, section 29(a) is not substantive,
but procedural law. Therefore, section 29(a) does not forbid a
waiver of section 27 of the Exchange Act.
154. Id.
155. See id. For an example where substantive rights were inadequately protected,
see Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (court ruled
that "fraudulent inducement" in signing the customer agreement makes McMahon
inoperable).
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Again, the language of section 29(a) of the Exchange Act is similar
to that of section 14 of the Securities Act. Since, section 14 was the
cornerstone of the Wilko court's reasoning, the salient point of the
Wilko decision has been frustrated. Therefore, McMahon dictates
that section 14 of the Securities Act can now be permissibly waived.
The impact of the McMahon decision upon the Wilko doctrine
comes from the McMahon court's affirmance of the scope and intent
of the FAA, not from the statutory construction. The McMahon court
ruled that section two of the FAA requires that security arbitration
agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." The
Court conclusively held that the FAA firmly establishes a federal pol-
icy favoring arbitration. Consequently, the FAA, standing alone,
mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims.
The McMahon court proclaimed that the basis of the Wilko decision
was founded upon a general suspicion of arbitration and the compe-
tence of arbitration tribunals. Therefore, the McMahon decision
mandates the enforcement of predispute arbitration clauses in bro-
kerage firm's customer account agreements. Such agreements can
only be revocable and unenforceable upon the grounds that exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
CONCLUSION
The scope, intent and application of the FAA now stands alone.
Past judicial mistrust of arbitration tribunals do not have validity in
today's courts. Arbitration should be pursued whenever it is feasible
to do so. Former ChiefJustice Warren E. Burger has stated that: "I
cannot emphasize too strongly to those in business and industry -
and especially to lawyers - that every private contract of real conse-
quence to the parties ought to be treated as a candidate for binding
private arbitration."] 58
"There is some form of mass neurosis that leads many people to
think courts were created to solve all the problems of mankind. We
must learn from the experience of labor and management that courts
are not the best places to resolve certain kinds of claims."159 As
Abraham Lincoln once stated: "Discourage litigation. Persuade
your neighbors to compromise whenever you can. Point out to them
how the nominal winner is often a real loser - in fees, expenses, and
waste of time."160
158. Burger, supra note 1, at 6.
159. Id. at 5.
160. Id. at 4 (quoting Abraham Lincoln).
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The Wilko doctrine is antiquated. The decision of Wilko v. Swan
should be overruled.161
Robert Howe
161. Justice Stevens dissented to the arbitrability of l0b claims in McMahon. Jus-
tice Stevens stated that, because of the longevity of the Wilko doctrine, he thought
that Congress should resolve the arbitrability issue, not the Court. Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2359 (1987) (Stevens, J,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is an opinion worth noting. Congres-
sional action would certainly halt much of the unwanted litigation that still surrounds
the securities arbitration issue.
22
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